Blocked Exchanges Revisited
[This is work in progress - comments welcome]
Tibor R. Machan

To Foster "Generosity"
=09I have argued elsewhere that the virtue of generosity can be
practiced fully (although also neglected) in a political system that fully
protects the right to negative liberty, including to earning, holding and
distributing private property as one judges p roper.1 Any virtue may, of
course, be practiced even under the most oppressive circumstances.  Most
political dissidents in the gulags or concentration camp inmates certainly
had the capacity as well as some opportunity to be virtuous (or vicious).=
=20
The range of their opportunities were, however, severely limited by those
who unjustly incarcerated them.  One's "moral space," to use Robert
Nozick's term, will be limited to the degree that one's negative rights
are abridged, violated.  If an innocent citizen is forcibly prevented from
speaking for 20 hours every day, he or she can speak honestly or dishones
tly only within the four hours left, while someone who is not prevented
from speaking for over ten hours, faces a greater range of moral (as well
as, morally irrelevant) choices.  This, in turn, clearly limits such an
individual's moral options.  It curta ils the person's sovereignty.=20
Others, not the agent, will decide whether and/or how he or she will
behave.  This, in turn, is morally objectionable.  It deprives the person
who is the target of such restrictions or constraints from being able to
take cha rge of his or her conduct, to direct himself or herself in life,
thus robbing the person of the opportunity to earn moral credit, to become
morally better (or worse).  One might even regard the situation of the
agent as being a version of unjust subjugati on to the will of others. One
objection to this conclusion comes from those who advocate what has come
to be called "blocked exchanges."  They provide an account of the
relationship between the virtue of generosity and the constitution of a
good human community by proposing that t here are some goods and services
that human beings should not sell to one another which then will enhance
their "freedom to choose" to be generous, charitable.  The phrase "blocked
exchanges" has been coined, and used prominently, by Michael Walzer, to
designate the contention that government ought not to allow certain goods
and services to be traded freely.2=20
=09The central point advanced is that when it comes to i tems such as
kidneys, hearts, bone marrow, blood and activities such as surrogate
mothering, artificial insemination, organ transplanting, etc., agents with
the capacity to offer and receive these should never do so via trade.3
From=20this it is concluded that governments ought to prohibit any trade in
such goods and services.  Prohibiting trade in such goods and services is
believed to be required so as to encourage those virtues.  If this line of
reasoning succeeds, these virtues would be practiced with only the limited
choice facing the agents who might practice them, the choice of either not
providing the goods or services in question or donating them.  The
alternative of selling them will have been foreclosed.  First of all, that
is arguably going to provide those agents with no chance of, for example,
doing the wrong thing or practicing some other possible virtue, such as
prudence, with regard to those goods and services.  They will, in short,
have various opportunities of exercising their moral agency restricted.=20
Furthermore, it also prohibits what may well be, contrary to the
assumptions made by blocked exchange advocates, morally decent trade in
blood, organs, etc.  In this discussion I plan to argue for both of these
points=BEblocking exchanges limits the moral worth of charitable, generous
conduct and outright prohibits conduct that is often morally worthwhile.=20
I will also suggest some reasons why the idea of blocki ng such exchanges
may appear to be so clearly right to those who propose it.  Goods and
Services Not for Sale Walzer's list includes items that not only should
not be but cannot be sold-e.g., human beings (it is not a sale but
kidnapping and abduction when they are taken against their will), criminal
justice (the legal system, including criminal justice, is the f ramework
for exchange and cannot itself be made the subject of exchange); numerous
rights (which, of course, are the moral-political basis of the institution
of exchange and could not themselves be exchanged-e.g., the right to
property, free speech, freed om of religion, etc.).  Talk about buying
such things is entirely misleading.  "Buying" justice is, in fact,
bribery, extortion and corruption, not a bona fide trade.  Not everything
involving the human transfer or obtaining of values counts as trade=BEthef
t, robbery, kidnapping, extortion, rape, etc., procure certain values for
people without amounting to trade=BEi.e., the voluntary exchange of
alienable goods and services that (rightfully) belongs to the parties
making the exchange.  Using such terms as "bu ying" or "business" or
"contracting" in such cases involves, at best, irony, parody and, often,
outright cynicism. It is symptomatic of debates surrounding novel
possibilities we face that impatient folks will want to win the argument
by way of what I wis h to dub "premature characterization."  Unalienable
items such as one's love, status, skills, etc., are not open for sale.=20
One cannot sell one's academic degree, age, parentage, heritage, etc.  We
speak of "my citizenship" or "my degree" but only in the sense in which we
speak of "my age" or "my weight," without implying alienable possessions.=
=20
I will examine this topic by considering Richard Titmuss'4 position on
selling versus donating blood.  Titmuss was concerned with the adverse
impact of selling on donation.  He asked "whether the blood transfusion
services and the use and distribution of human blood should be treated as
a market consumption good."  He believes that if the answer is in the
affirmative, "Hospitals, nursing homes, clinical laboratories, schools,
universities and even, perhaps, churches would no longer be protected by
laws or common conventions of 'charitable' immunity; they would be exposed
to the forces of economic calculation and to the laws of the
marketplace."5 Titmuss' point is quite simple: selling blood undermines a
decent society because it is an untoward, morally irrelevant or even
odious exchange, one that diverts us from our duty to help. To be "exposed
to the forces of economic calculation and to the law s of the marketplace"
appears to be without moral merit, naturally, since one is then being
pushed around, forced, to do things, instead of making acting from moral
deliberation.  Or one is indulging the morally odious temptation to reap
profits.  Both st and in the way of doing what is morally decent, donating
blood. This line of reasoning clearly suggests that only donations of
blood are morally proper whereas selling involves the amoral process or
possibly immoral practice of economic calculation.  So as to promote
morality, then, such trade ought to be banned.  As he puts it, "Modern
societies require more rather than less freedom of choice for the
expression of altruism in the daily life of all social groups."6 So,
blocking blood trade will increase freedom of choice to do what is morally
right by limiting the fr eedom of choice to do what is morally
objectionable.=20

No Utilitarian Solutions =20
=09Let me mention, briefly, that the position of Titmuss is attacked
by some economists, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow,7 and, by implication,
Elisabeth M. Landes and Richard A. Posner8, mainly on utilitarian grounds.=
=20
Leon R. Kass,9 for example, argues that selling organs, etc., should be
permitted because it will promote value.  His point is not that it is
either often morally appropriate or that individuals have a basic right to
engage in that kind of sale.  He argues that there is evidence that
prohibiting the s ale of blood (and, by implication, other emergency goods
and services), the society is harmed=BEi.e., there is an overall loss of
provisions in cases of emergencies.=20
=09These approaches are, I believe, flawed.  For one, they go to the
other extreme by reducing too many human relationships to economics or
commerce and thus support Titmuss' concerns.  The neoclassical economic
approach to human behavior is well delineated by the Nobel prize winning
University of Chicago economist, Gary Becker.10 Its basic theme may be put
bluntly as "everything has a price" or, more technically, we are all
utility maximizers, regardless of what is at stake. As the late George
Stigler put it, "Man is eternally a utility-maximizer=BEin his home, in his
office (be it public or private), in his church, in his scientific work=BEi=
n
short, everywhere."11 One aspect of this thesis is that not only is there
nothing morally objectionable about selling blood, kidneys or whatever but
even when one donates such things one is necessarily, actually just
seeking some sort of in-kind-benefit from such conduct since , after all,
one is always a utility maximizer. Perhaps one is seeking to make oneself
feel good.  But this view, as I argue elsewhere, is either just wrong or
an empty tautology.12 Arguing along even the more usual, ethical=BEas
distinct from economic=BEutilitarian lines will tend to come off as inferio=
r
in comparison to a non-consequentialist moral viewpoint, one that is
virtue or rule oriented.  Utilitarianism is a value theory and te nds to
be unsatisfactory as an ethics of virtue or right conduct.  The reason
is=BEand I am only offering a suggestion here=BEthat when it comes to
considering moral conduct, assessment of aggregate results is not enough
in assessing an agent's character or conduct.  This is probably why in
ordinary discussions we often respond well to the exclamation, "But I
didn't mean to do it" or "I meant well." We are often concerned with
whether some act exhibits moral worth in and of itself.  For utilitarians
what cou nts for something is long-term aggregate consequences that are
difficult if not impossible to attend to as one gives direction to one's
discrete actions.  (This may account for why many make use of utilitarian
analysis for public policy purposes but do no t so much apply it to
discussions of individual moral worth.) As Titmuss himself notes, "Givers
are in no position themselves to evaluate gains and losses to themselves
or to others.  Professional arbiters decide but they, in turn, can seldom
estimate as individuals the gains and losses for either the givers or the
recipients."13 In matters of morality it seems to be more germane to
establish whether what we are doing is right as a matter of the quality of
the private action itself, even if consequences may be unknown.  At the
political level, too, when we are conc erned with justice, we tend to
focus on more than the consequences of conduct and policy.=20

Does Justice Require Altruism?
=09Justice, at least in most cases, is a matter pertinent to how
individuals are treated.  In the criminal law justice is often a matter of
due process=BEi.e., the right procedure, one that is due the accused, for
example.  Arguably in the long run unjust prac tices will probably die out
because they are usually counter-productive for the culprits (if they are
known to the public).  So if it sufficed as a remedy for such practices to
gradually vanish from the society, it would be enough for justice to
prevail t o wait for their disappearance.  (This is, indeed, what
economists often argue.) Nevertheless, those who are experiencing unjust
practices are being badly treated and in justice this should stop.  They
should not have to weather the treatment even while it is admittedly
fizzling out However, if some conduct is ethically wrong but not unjust,
such as the failure for someone to attain a value (as when someone is a
coward or imprudent), no remedy is due.  Those who lack courage or
prudence or charity are not acting unjustly, only immora lly.  Exhorting
against the practice, urging its expunging=BEmaybe because of its general
adverse impact on human character and relationships=BEwould suffice.  Other
examples of such conduct would be laziness, sloth, lack forthrightness,
dishonesty, betrayal, lack of generosity or charity, etc.  If, however,
certain conduct amounts to an injustice, then it requires remedy because
what is due to someone isn't forthcoming or what isn't do was.  Clear
cases are assault, kidnapping, rape, murder, robbery, extortion, etc. An
injustice by one, in other words, takes from another what belongs to the
other and this needs to be remedied or punished for the society to remain
intact as hospitable to human living and flourishing.  The legal systems
of societies live up to this when their members are required to honor each
other's moral space, the mutual though separate opportunity to morally
advance one's life.  While this contains consequentialist elements, it is
far from being utilitarian since it focuses on individual relations, not
on aggregate results. Should we, then, tolerate, the selling of blood-is
it an injustice either to those who might sell it to those who may have to
purchase it? Now, morally untoward exchanges are possible involving nearly
every sort of item-selling my book or the dinner I cooked to my own child
or wife would be morally perverse.  It is not, however, the selling that
makes it wrong, as indeed seems to be implied by criticisms of blood
selling but that one stands in a familial and not a commercial
relationship to the person to whom something would be sold.  To recall a
phrase from Marx=BEbut contrary to his sentiments=BEthere is nothing morall=
y
wrong, in principle, wi th a cash nexus, provided it does not gobble up
everything in its way.  And there is no reason to think that is must. What
further appears to make selling blood perverse is thinking in such cases
of selling to someone who is bleeding profusely, perhaps right in front of
the would be seller.  Donation in such cases would be, of course, the
morally right course to take, al though even then it would not amount to a
categorical imperative to comply.  (There can be cases when selling
something to a nominal or even an actual family member is not wrong=BEe.g.,
if such a member has just come into a windfall.) To know whether someon e
conducted himself or herself in a morally virtuous fashion one would need
to be near enough to know the details.  Suppose the bleeding bloke is none
other than Hitler or some serial killer.  It is for reasons of the
complexity of moral situations that t hey are dealt with more appropriate
in written novels as opposed to in ethics books that give only the
sketchiest of cases for us to ponder. Is there reason to think that
selling blood per se does anyone an injustice?  Doing so may at times show
lack of appropriate generosity.  Generosity presupposes one's ownership of
whatever it is with which one may be generous, so it clearly does not
belon g to the recipient.  Unless it is established that the prospective
beneficiary of putative generosity has a claim upon what the agent might
donate, refusing to be generous is not an injustice. In light of this,
requiring donations rather than trade is wro ng.  It limits the exercise
of the putative donor's moral agency.  No theory of positive rights seems
to me to succeed, however, without begging very serious moral issues=BEe.g.=
,
whether one's life is one's own or belongs to the group or humanity.  And
a positive rights theory actually undermines moral autonomy by making o
neself into a mere part of some larger whole which is then the integral
whole with moral responsibilities or duties. No, it seems that all that
the recipient of blood can ask for is generosity.  Yet even that needs to
be understood keeping in mind that there is something confusing about
acting generously and even charitably when one is forbidden to act
otherwise or rest ricted in one's alternative ways of using what is, after
all, one's own=BEone's blood, surrogate service or whatever.  Only limited
moral virtue can be manifest in generous conduct if there are only two
alternatives, not to donate or donate something that belongs to one.  If,
when I decide to part with my blood, I have only the option to give it
away or not to do so, my o ption of selling it has been taken away and the
virtue of resisting the temptation to do so is no longer available to me.=
=20
So, even if all trade in such goods and services were morally odious, that
still would not establish that it is right to prohibit tr ading them.=20
Only if it were unjust to do so would (supporting) placing a legal ban on
it be the right thing to do so.  In general, this is what is objectionable
about legislating morality=BEforcing people to act kindly, generously,
honestly, forthrightly, decently, prudently and the like all amount to
depriving people of or restricting their opportunity to choose the right
course from among many other alternatives that do not amount to cases of
injustice.  What about the agent?  Is some injustice being done to agents
when they are permitted to sell what might be generous of them to donate?=
=20
This idea, in order to be sound, would imply that members of one's
community are duty bound to treat one in a paternalistic fashion, securing
for one opportunities for morally good conduct and hiding from one
tempting possibilities, because this is owed t o one from them as it is
owed to children from their parents.  Indeed, such conduct is appropriate
for parents who have committed themselves to instilling good habits in
their children, as well as providing them with=BEnot, however, donating to
them=BEvarious goods and services, when they are dependents, minors. Once
the child grows into an adult, he or she needs to take over the moral
direction of his or her life and not be treated as a moral invalid. It
seems, then, that neither the prospective seller nor buyer is treated
unjustly by making it possible for the trade of blood=BEand by
extrapolation, other to be "blocked" items=BEto take place even if such
trade were morally objectionable.  Still, if it wer e purely amoral to
sell one's blood, and often immoral, the case for blocking its exchange
would at least be plausible. But is it Morally wrong?  What about the less
sweeping point, however, that such trade ought not to be entered into in
the first place?  Earlier I was concerned only with whether it is unjust
to fail to donate, so that laws might have to be enacted to encourage
donations for justi ce's sake.  Here I focus on whether failing to donate
in favor of selling needs be immoral, never mind unjust.  To put the
matter differently, mightn't it be the case that when it comes to certain
goods or services, these ought to be provided only via the virtue of
generosity or charity and not for any other consideration?  Thus, for
example, if blood or a kidney o r some bone marrow is to be transferred
from one person to another, the only morally proper motivation for this
could be generosity not, however, prudence.  Why not? I see no reason to
think so.  There is, arguably, nothing at all morally untoward or wrong
with selling blood to strangers: the contrary view assumes that there is
something wicked about intentionally benefiting from providing something
to others who need it badly and with whom one is not intimately related.=20
This contention is highly questionable and cannot simply be left as a
moral given.  Why should commercially, economically benefiting the agent,
as well, through such actions count for nothing from the moral point of
view?  The case for the clear moral superiority of donating blood, etc.,
versus selling it assumes that benefiting others i s morally better than
economically benefiting oneself, than seeking to prosper.  Indeed, it is
often contended, for example by Kant, that benefiting oneself counts for
nothing morally.  Yet, if those others to whom one is supposed to be
donating blood, etc. count for something morally, and if one is, in many
important respects just like they are, this differentiation of their
respective moral standing is unfounded. It recalls a truly par adoxical
line in one of Graham Greene's novels, "None of us has a right to forget
anyone.  Except ourselves." (Looser Takes All, Penguin, p. 51)

Misguided Moral Paradigms and Intuitions
=09In 1975 John Rawls presented his presidential address, "The
Independence of Moral Theory,"14 to the American Philosophical Association
meetings.  In it he proposed to divorce moral theorizing from the rest of
philosophy and argued "that the question as to the existence of objective
moral truths seems to depend on the kind and extent of the agreement that
would obtain among rational persons who have achieved, or sufficiently
approached, wide reflective equilibrium."15 This amounts to sharing a set
of cohe rent intuitions.  As he said, "a central part of moral philosophy
is what I have called moral theory: it consists in the comparative study
of moral conceptions, which is, in large part, independent."16 Intuitions,
however, are too loose to serve as the basis of moral judgment.  As the
following illustrates, they change from epoch to epoch. To us today the
revelation of the legal murders and cruelties connected with the trial of
children are revolting.  We have become so habituated to the kindly and
even anxious atmosphere of the Children's Courts, that it is hard to
believe that the full ce remonial, the dread ordeal, of the Assize Courts
could have been brought into use against little children of seven years
and upwards--judges uttering their cruel legal platitudes; the chaplain
sitting by assenting; the Sheriff in his impressive uniform; l adies
coming to the Court to be entertained by such a sight--the spectacle of a
terrified little child about to receive the death sentence which the
verdict of 12 men, probably fathers of families themselves, had given the
judge power to pass.17 Intuitive moral analysis became very influential
following the publications of Rawls' book on justice18 and the above
mentioned paper.  Up to that time the prominent metaethical position had
been emotivism but subsequently intuitionism took over.  Yet int uitionist
metaethics sanctions the introduction of one's "consider moral judgments"
or intuitions to address moral questions.  But what is it that shapes
these intuitions, particular among moral philosophers, if not some of the
most impressive substantive moral views that have been handed down through
history. Accordingly, it would not be surprising that those who contend
that donation but not trade has moral value are intuitively predisposed
toward a (a) deontological and/or (b) altruistic ethics.  That is, many
critics of the right to freely trade blood, etc. =BEincluding whether one
will choose to be generous or charitable=BEwould likely entertain the
considered moral judgment that morally decent conduct in general must not
have as its purpose personal (e.g., economic) benefit; or, the only kind
of conduct that c ounts as having moral legitimacy is conduct that is
helpful toward others, especially those in dire need of help.  Mother
Teresa, widely taken to be the quintessential exemplary moral agent,
testifies to both of these predispositions as, of course, does m uch of
post-Kantian contemporary moral theory.  Prudence does not count as a
morally praiseworthy motive.19 Indeed, it is a Kantian idea that underlies
the view Titmuss and Walzer endorse=BEalthough it is not possible here to
show that they themselves deliberately entertained Kantian ethical notions
as they developed their views on blocked exchanges.  It is, in a ny case,
a feature of this Kantian legacy on moral matters that to do the morally
right thing, one can have no primary personal interest in the results of a
deed.  Thus what was once dubbed the first of the cardinal virtues,
prudence, gets demoted into so me sort of amorality, at best, or even
something selfish and callous.  Why?  Because the moral intuitions of many
applied ethicists, influenced by a Kantian powerful moral legacy, would so
have it. Yet neither is intuitionism all that plausible, nor is Kantian
deontologism at all well grounded.  We have already noted that
intuitionism deprives morality of exactly what it needs, an ongoing,
stable standard that does not alter with public sentiment.  And
considering that deontologism rests on Kant's contention that there exists
two realms of reality, the noumenal and the phenomenal, and that the human
will can have no determinate impact on the latter (which is determined by
the laws of classical physi cs), his views have to be taken with a grain
of salt.  The extremely prominent role played by the pure will in
determining what counts as being good conduct=BEto the exclusion of goals o=
r
ends, as in Aristotle's teleological ethics=BEmay not be defensible onc e
the Kantian metaphysics is discarded as indefensible.  It is my idea that
Titmuss, Walzer and others who find donations morally superior to trade
are working from within a moral paradigm that is, at the end of the day,
plain wrong.  Donation has the cha racteristic of not being
self-interested, of flowing from some kind of categorical imperative about
doing good to others.  Once it is transmuted into a Rawlsian framework, it
would make a good candidate for a basic moral intuition.  Selling, of
course, fa ils from the outset since it is so evidently prima facie
self-interested. Why the Concern with Broad Trends?  It may be objected
that in this discussion such broad considerations of historical pedigree
are irrelevant.  Yet that seems to me quite na=EFve.  If there is
significance to the work of moral philosophers, surely part of it is that
they influence how we, es pecially subsequent thinkers, view moral issues.=
=20
It might be noted, in this connection, how confidently Titmuss states that
what is needed is "freedom of choice for the expression of altruism,"
indicating that he takes it as given that it is indeed altru ism that is
the right moral stance for us to take, that there is no room for debate
about that.  Accordingly, while in the later 20th century=BEwhen piecemeal
moral analysis is the vogue=BEsystematic moral analysis may seem to be out
of line, this is open to serious criticism.  That what constitutes the
"moral point of view," spelled out by Kurt Baier in a book by the same
title, is taken to be altruism is hard to deny.  Baire, who pretty much
set the tone of pre-intuitionist substantive moral analysis, held that
"morality is designed to apply in ... cases ... where interests
conflict."20 This means th at morality adjudicates among people but does
not guide individuals to the right course they ought to take outside of
such conflicts.  For instance, only if one faces the option to act against
one's interest and in favor of another's, as in the present ca se, namely,
one can either donate something (thereby serving another's interest) or
keep or use it to trade (serving one's own interest), is one involved in a
moral decision.  And, as Titmuss makes quite clear, "the freedom of choice
for the expression of altruism [i.e., charity or generosity]" deserves to
be increased, thus eliminating the freedom of choice representing egoism
[i.e., prudence].  What other reason could there be for this than that
Titmuss, as many others, take it as given that altruism is true even
though they do not argue for this.  The reason, it seems to me, is that
they accept the moral paradigm introduced by Kant, Comte, Marx and others
who thought that our primary duty is to other people.  That morality or
ethics could well involve pursuing one's own successful life=BEthat it may
also pertain, as it did for Aristotle, to choices from among alternative
goals one could pursue=BEis simply excluded in this approach.=20
Altruism=BEwhich is a systematic moral stance laid out by August Comte
requiring one to place the welfare of others ahead of one's own=BEfits the
Kantian approach roughly but nicely enough.  For Kant serving other's
needs could easily qualify as conduct that is counter-inclined.  Altruism
is also accommodating to the Christian idea that we are born with original
sin, which naturally inclines us toward selfishness, and thus need to be
rescued by inculcating in us a primary concern for others so as to render
us civilized.  There is also some support for altruism from ordinary
language.  When we talk about moral matters, we tend to discuss what one
ought to do for others.  Whereas kindness, compassion, considerateness,
generosity and charity and such are concerns frequently called upon to be
voiced, prudence, industry, ambition, and moderation are virtues that tend
to remain private concerns for the agent to ponder and invoke.  In other
words, the former moral virtues are of social concern and are likely to be
the subject ma tter of communication.  Matters of personal ethical concern
tend to be dealt with silently, on one's own or mostly with intimates.=20
Furthermore, as W. D. Falk observed, "mature moral commitments are those
to conduct which is of social concern."21 He adds , however, that "this
usage is unexceptionable as long as its implications are faced...One must
grant that 'morality' on this level is demoted from its accustomed place
of being the sole and final arbiter of right and wrong choice."22 How can
the criteri a be secured by which to manage the arbitration?  Well, I
would suggest that Aristotle provides the best answer: human nature is the
standard of right and wrong and along these lines there can certainly be
cases when not donating blood but selling it coul d be the ethical,
prudent, thing to do! Since I have been discussing influential ideas about
morality, let me also to make note of the Marxist theory of alienation,
especially as regards the characterization of trade.  For Marx selling per
se exemplifies alienation, an estrangement from one's h uman nature.=20
Human nature, in turn, is seen (eventually to be realized) as
fundamentally altruistic, social-as Marx put it quite explicitly, "The
human essence is the true collectivity of man."23 While this has some of
the elements of Aristotelian ethic s, Marx restricts what counts as truly
human to the altruistic aspects of self-development, leaving prudence out
of the picture entirely.  (The reason of this has to do with Marx's
concept of specie-being and his demotion of personal or individual traits
and purposes, such that they manifest trivial pursuit, fetishism, not
genuine moral tasks.)24 Considering Marx's influence in social and
political analysis within our age=BEdue, I believe, in large part to his
secularization of ancient tribal and subsequently religious communitarian
sentiments=BEit is not surprising that some philosophers would confid ently
assume, at least in part, Marx's conceptual influences.  In a kind of
Kuhnean mode, they would not bother to substantiate the philosophical
underpinnings that lie in back of the Marxian normative framework=BEtheir
work is more, a la Kuhn, along lines of "normal science."  If the
social/political philosophical paradigm in (social) vogue entirely
embraces the tenets of altruism and, indeed, proclaims the idea as
"socialist man," it is not odd at all that work in social/political
philosophy would center on the details of that paradigm.  In Western
societies which also enjoy the influence of classical liberalism,
especially in its legal institutions-e.g., the doctrine of individual
rights as regards due process of law and the right to private property-one
way the intellectually influentia l Marxist paradigm can be applied is to
deploy it as the critical framework for analyzing various bits and pieces
of commercial life.  As Falk notes, "The concept of morality itself bears
the accumulated scars of conceptual evolution."25 What is off About the
Legacy The first thing to note is that here we find a confusion afoot
consisting of an equivocation between what is ethical or moral and what a
particular moral theory, namely, altruism contends is to be regarded as
morally right.  And, no doubt, from any plausi ble ethical framework,
acting generously is often morally warranted, especially in cases when
emergencies arise.  In short, I should not normally cash in on the misery
of another person, especially ones of whose misery I am aware is a matter
of bad luck a nd which I can alleviate.  But this is not always the case.=
=20
I could also be acting morally when I seek out my own success in life,
when I try to secure financial well-being, at least if altruism is
rejected as the best moral system. Suppose the eudaimonistic,
self-actualizing view of David L. Norton, turns out to be a better moral
theory.26 In its terms, it is arguable that all trade has the potential to
enhance the life of the agents involved.  When both parties take advantage
of each other's wants of what the other can provide, they could be acting
ethically.  This includes when blood, etc., may be traded.  It may then be
only sensible, industrious, to secure some benefits via trade; it would be
the prudent thing to do.  This, in turn, is morally good, since it is
ethical, on the whole, to engage in conduct tha t serves to make ones life
a good one.  In short, economic advancement is one facet of a morally good
human life.  Trade, therefore, can be moral and often is.  Donations, in
turn, can at times be irresponsible, a kind of generosity to a fault.
Non-theoretical Ethics Ordinary morality does not adjudicate between
generosity, courage, prudence, and other virtues.  For that one requires a
moral theory, a conception of the good human life with the needed
priorities laid out so that moral dilemmas that cannot be dealt with by
way of ordinary moral conceptions or beliefs may be handled successfully.=
=20
In any case, though we are not going to handle the matter here in full,
the Aristotelian ethical idea that one ought to seek out one's happiness,
of which practicing the virtue s is a constitutive feature, can make
pretty good moral sense of the idea that embarking upon trade can be
morally praiseworthy.  That, in turn, can apply to trading one's blood
under some circumstances. Usually generosity applies to how I should treat
members of my family, friends and other close associates whose
circumstances I know well enough. With them I have at least a prima facie
responsibility to help, deriving from our established bonds.  These r
elationship are voluntarily assumed=BEone has either freely committed
oneself to them or they are the only options one faces (e.g., as a child).=
=20
As such, one's obligations are established by oneself instead of imposed
upon one by the will of others.  That such obligations take priority over
others is a view that competes with one in which one is taken to have
obligations that one has never chosen to assume, ones that place one into
involuntary servitude to others.  As we have noted above, given other
people priority in one's life without one's consent begs the question
about who is to be the focus of one's attention in one's life.  Arguably,
it is over oneself one has better understanding and greater control, so
the idea that it is one's moral task to direct oneself to flourish in life
is quite plausible.  But the issue cannot be taken up in full here.=20
Non-Altruistic Ethics and Free Exchanges If, however, one rejects this
position, the story about morality can look quite different.  Aristotle,
as noted already, thought that acting in accordance with human nature is
just exactly what will guide one to human excellence, the goal of the
ethical l ife.  And for this end the virtue of prudence is extremely
vital.  Unless one interprets prudence in wholly dualistic terms, such
that taking care of oneself comes to preparing for the afterlife, then
seeking economic well-being can be taken as required b y it. Accordingly,
it is possible that selling blood, or anything else that Titmuss and
Walzer would wish to place on the "blocked" list, could constitute an act
of prudence and thus a virtuous deed. No doubt, in a country with a free
market one would have a legal right to sell blood even to a relative or
friend which would amount to something tacky or morally odious.=20
Nevertheless, just because wicked actions are made possible by certain
institutions =BEe.g., the protection of the right to privacy or religious
liberty=BEit does not follow that those institutions are unjustified.=20
Indeed, how could one ever do something morally wrong if morally wrong
things had to be forbidden?!  The very possibility of mo ral achievement
would be seriously restricted, though not abolished, in a society in which
immoral conduct would be banned.=20

Some Objections Considered
=09Some argue that this isn't so because, after all, even persons in
concentration camps are no less moral agents than those outside. Let S and
T both be moral agents.  S has n moral opportunities for virtuous behavior
and n opportunities for vicious behavi or.  T has m moral opportunities
for virtuous behavior and m opportunities for vicious behavior.  Let S
capitalize on all his opportunities for virtuous behavior, and resist all
his opportunities for vicious behavior.  Let T do likewise.  Further, let
m>n .  Now, if your argument does what you think it does, S is less a
moral agent (not as full a moral agent) than T.  He's had less
opportunities to "show his moral stuff". The above, some would argue, is
an absurd conclusion.  Why?  Because if it were right, we'd have to regard
concentration camp prisoners as lesser moral agents than their
imprisoners, because they have fewer moral opportunities.27
=09The point, however, is not that the prisoners are not moral agents
or in some sense lack some degree of moral agency, only that they clearly
lack the degree of opportunity of exercising their moral agency that those
who aren't in concentration camps poss ess.  So, yes, the imprisoning
agents have a greater opportunity to act morally than those inside the
camps=BEe.g., they could liberate the prisoners, while the prisoners
ordinarily have no chance of doing anything along such lines.  It is not
the ontologic al state of moral agency that is different between the two
groups but the prospect for actualizing one's potentiality as a moral
agent. Both those in and out are surely equal moral agents, though,
clearly, their opportunity to exercise their moral agency is significantly
different, something that is not morally unimportant and ought to induce
those who are in charge of the camps to open them up. In less drastic
moral situations the same holds true.  Restricting someone's opportunity
to make moral decisions, provided no injustice is being contemplated, is
wrong.  If I hold a gun to someone's head and order the person to either
given his or her mon ey to George or keep it without the option to
exchange it for groceries, I am impeding that individual's moral
sovereignty=BEthat is, his or her moral authority to decide what he or she
will do, be it the right thing or the wrong.  This will not make the pe
rson less of a moral agent but it will restrict his or her choices that
may well be of moral significance. None of what Titmuss and others have
argued either supports banning trade in blood, etc., nor that if you have
blood to spare, it is never morally right to sell it.  There can be
morally justifiable=BEprudential=BEreasons for such a deed.  If one has los=
t
one 's job, selling one's blood or kidney or contracting to be a paid
surrogate mother could be one way one can obtain some extra funds=BEperhaps
so as to help oneself, one's loved ones or one's chosen charities to
flourish.  There is, in short, no reason one o ught not to, on certain
occasions, make the prudential move to sell one's blood or kidney or bone
marrow?  The reason this is not deemed feasible, as I have suggested
above, is due more to the general paradigm within which the alternative is
being considered than any impartial moral analysis.  It is widely held
that no one ought to be left in such a state as t o need to sell his or
her blood, kidney or bone marrow.  The reason is that no one could have
gotten into such a state deservedly, as a matter of his or her own fault.=
=20
It would thus be unfair to charge anyone for what it would take to escape
such dire st raits. Conclusion The idea of this paper is really quite
simple.  Titmuss, Walzer and others believe that donations of blood, etc.,
are morally worthwhile while selling blood is morally worthless.  So we
should ban the sale of blood, etc.  This will enhance moral conduct (
increase the freedom to choose moral conduct).  I have argued (a) to be
generous if one cannot be prudent instead decreases the worth of
generosity since it faces no competing moral options and (b) that Titmuss
and others assume that sales of blood, etc., are not or could not be
morally proper and if t hey are blocked, this could not be decreasing
moral conduct.  But that is wrong, unless prudence is not a virtue and
only charity or generosity are.  Since, however, prudence is a virtue and
selling one's blood, etc., could well be the prudent thing for s omeone to
do, this assumption is mistaken. Ergo, blocked exchanges do not improve
the moral situation at all, quite the contrary: they prohibit prudential
use and diminish the moral worth of the generous use of one's blood.=20


Endnotes:=20

1 Tibor R. Machan, "Politics and Generosity," Journal of Applied
Philosophy Vol. 7 (1990), pp. 61-73.  The rights in question are rights
per se, not some truncated versions some philosophers have called "prima
facie" rights.  See, Tibor R. Machan, "Prima Facia versus Natural (Human)
Rights," The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vo. 10 (Summer 1976), pp. 119-131.=
=20

2 See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1990), pp. 100-103.  For a very clear exposition of the
central ideas involved in this thesis, see Judith Andre, "Blocked
Exchanges: A Taxonomy," Ethics (forthcoming).  See , also, Eric Mack,
"Dominos and the Fear of Commodification," in John Chapman and J. Roland
Pennock, eds., Markets and Justice (Nomos XXXI) (New York: New York
University Press, 1989).  At this point I'll leave aside different sense
of the concept "free"  and use it to mean "uncoerced" or "unintrusive upon
one's person and estate."=20

3 For example, Jerry Brown argued in his campaign for the Democratic
presidential nomination in 1992 that "health care should not be a
commodity, to be sold for profit" and advocated a universal health care
system.  Hillary Rodham Clinton, too, characte rized health care as a
basic right.  The positive rights tradition in political thought provides
a rational for this in terms of the natural disadvantages of certain
classes of people=BEworkers, consumers, the poor, minorities, et al.=20

4 Richard Titmuss, The Gift Relationship (London and New York: Pantheon,
1971)

5 R. M. Titmuss, "Who is my stranger?" in Noel Timms and David Watson,
eds., Talking About Welfare (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), p.
211.=20

6 =09Ibid., p. 221.

7 Kenneth J. Arrow, "Gifts and Exchanges," Philosophy and Public Affairs,
Vol. 1 (1972).=20

8 Elisabeth M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "The Economics of Baby
Shortage," Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 7 (1978).=20

9 Leon R. Kass, "Organs for Sale? Propriety, property, and the price of
progress," The Public Interest, No. 107 (1992), pp. 65-86.=20

10 Gary Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1978).=20

11 Quoted in Richard McKenzie, The Limits of Economic Science (Boston:
Kluwer-Nijhoff Publ., 1983), p. 6.=20

12 Op. cit., Machan, Capitalism and Individualism.=20

13 Op. cit., Titmuss, "Who is my stranger?" p. 215.=20

14 John Rawls, "The Independence of Moral Theory," Proceedings and
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. XLVII (Newark,
DE: American Philosophical Association, 1975), pp. 5-22.=20

15 Ibid., p. 21.=20

16 =09Ibid.

17 Ernest W. Pettifer, Punishments of Former Days (East Ardsley, England:=
=20
EP Publishing, Ltd., 1974), pp. 35-6.=20

18 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1971).=20

19 For an outstanding discussion of this and related points, see Douglas
J. Den Uyl, The Virtue of Prudence (New York: Peter Lang Publisher, 1991).=
=20

20 Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1958), p. 190.=20

21 W. D. Falk, Ought, Reasons, and Morality (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1986), p. 230.=20

22 =09Ibid.

23=09Op. cit., Marx, Selected Writings, p. 126.

24 Arguably, though, Marx may not even have room for morality in his
social-political analysis, given the strong deterministic aspects of his
explanation of human behavior.  For more on this, see Tibor R. Machan,
Marxism: A Bourgeois Critique (Bradford, England: MCB University Press,
1988).=20

25 =09Op. cit., Falk, Ought, Reasons, and Morality, p. 231.

26 David L. Norton, Personal Destinies, A Philosophy of Ethical
Individualism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).=20

27 These last few points were put to me by my colleague Kelly Dean Jolley.=
=20
I wish to thank him for his critical observations.=20