Environmentalism Humanized Tibor R. Machan Introduction I want to argue here the case of a certain type of=20 anthropocentrism, the view that human beings are more important or=20 valuable1 than other aspects of nature, including plants and animals. I=20 begin with some clarifications of terms I plan to use and then explore=20 whether anything in my anthropocentric position contradicts the tenets of evolutionary biology. I also consider whether the ascription of a moral=20 nature to human beings makes sense and how it squares with certain=20 objections from those who would take animals, for example, to have nearly= equal moral status to human beings. I consider, next, some political=20 implications of what I have discussed, specifically as they bear on=20 environmental public policy. =20 First, by anthropocentrism is not meant that human beings -- as a collectivity -- are the telos of existence, the ultimate aim or end or=20 the central fact of the universe. All that is meant is that human beings are of the highest value in the known universe.=20 To construe human beings as the highest value in the known=20 universe, they are identified thus as individuals of a given kind. There is no concrete universal "human being," only individual human beings2. =20 The conception of humanity as a kind of collective whole entity derives,=20 in the main, from the legacy of Platonic metaphysics that regarded=20 general abstract ideas or universals, at least in its standard rendition, as concrete albeit intellectual or spiritual beings. is not=20 metaphysically sound. On the other hand, neither are individuals=20 entirely unique. They are of a specific kind -- e.g., human, feline,=20 male, apple, etc. For anthropocentrism to be metaphysically cogent,=20 individual human beings would have to be the most valuable entities in=20 nature. =20 This point about the sort of individualist anthropocentrism to be= discussed serves to preempt any objections that may be grounded on the=20 philosophical and moral weaknesses of radical individualism, the sort=20 derived from Hobbes and carried to its logical implications by the 19th=20 century German social thinker Max Stirner. The individualism or egoism=20 discussed here -- dubbed "classical," so as to distinguish it from the=20 "atomic" or "radical" variety commonly criticized by those who wish to=20 call attention to the social nature of human beings -- recognizes that=20 the human individual is so classified for good reasons, based on the=20 rational recognition of kinds of beings in nature. This then renders=20 justified not only personal but several social virtues -- generosity,=20 charity, compassion.3 It is also recognized in this view that a virtue=20 must be practiced by choice and cannot be coerced.=20 All in all, the position here considered is still a bona fide=20 individualism since it identifies human nature as essentially individual, in contrast to, for example, Karl Marx who states that "The human essence is the true collectivity of man" or August Comte who argues that=20 [The] social point of view ... cannot tolerate the notion of=20 rights, for such notion rests on individualism. We are born under a load of obligations of every kind, to our predecessors, to our successors, to=20 our contemporaries. After our birth these obligations increase or=20 accumulate, for it is some time before we can return any service.... This ["to live for others"], the definitive formula of human morality, gives a direct sanction exclusively to our instincts of benevolence, the common=20 source of happiness and duty. [Man must serve] Humanity, whose we are=20 entirely. If this argument is sound, it will establish in large measure that in=20 discussing environmental ethics -- whether at the level of principles or=20 applied morality -- the highest value must be attributed to measures that enhance the lives of individual human beings on earth. There will be no=20 reliance here on supernaturalism to advance the argument. The aim is to=20 defend the anthropocentric position from within a naturalistic framework=20 -- that is, by sticking to considerations based on our understanding of=20 the natural world, including the nature of living beings such as plants,=20 animals and human beings.5 However, neither is it the position here that human beings are=20 "uniquely important [or valuable]," a view avidly ridiculed by Stephen R. L. Clark, who claims that "there seems no decent ground in reason or=20 revelation to suppose that man is uniquely important or significant."6 =20 If human beings were uniquely important, that would imply that one had no basis for assigning any value to plants or non-human animals apart from=20 their relationship to human beings. That is not the position to be=20 defended. What will be argued, instead, is that there is a scale of=20 values in nature and among all the various kinds of beings, human beings=20 are the most valuable -- even while it is true that some members of the=20 human species may indeed prove themselves to be the most vile and=20 worthless, as well. This is all that anthropocentrism requires. The Importance of Being Human =20 How do we establish that something is most valuable? First we=20 must consider whether the idea of lesser or greater value in nature makes clear sense and we must apply these considerations to an understanding of whether human beings or other animals are the most valuable. If it turns out that ranking things in nature as more or less valuable makes sense,=20 and if we qualify as more valuable than other animals, there is at least=20 the beginning of a reason why we may make use of other animals for our=20 purposes.=20 Let me make clear that even if it were not the case that human=20 beings are more valuable than other aspects of nature, it is doubtful=20 that any conclusions could follow from this warranting policies that=20 favor these other aspects. It would seem that only if it can be shown=20 that beings other than humans qualify as being of supreme importance,=20 based on arguments that do not draw on esoteric knowledge or intuition=20 but on commonly accessible evidence and sound theories, would we have to=20 yield our policies focusing on our welfare in favor of some alternative=20 objective.=20 Quite independently of the implicit acknowledgment even by many=20 environmentalists of the qualitatively hierarchical structure of nature,=20 there is evidence through the natural world of the existence of beings of greater complexity as well as of higher value. For example, while it=20 makes no sense to evaluate as good or bad such things as planets or rocks or pebbles---except as they may relate to goals or purposes of living=20 things---when it comes to plants and animals the process of evaluation=20 commences very naturally indeed. We can and most of us tend to speak of=20 better or worse trees, oaks, redwoods, or zebras, foxes or chimps. =20 Clearly, if we could not do this rationally, there would be little point=20 to environmental ethics in the first place, a field that presupposes=20 value differentiation through and through.=20 Now, while at this stage we confine our evaluations to the=20 condition or behavior of living beings without any intimation of their=20 responsibility for being better or worse, when we start discussing human=20 beings our evaluation takes on an additional, namely, moral component. =20 Indeed, none are more ready to testify to this than environmental=20 ethicists who, after all, do not demand any change of behavior on the=20 part of non-human beings but insist that human beings conform to certain=20 moral edicts as a matter of their own choice, as what ought or oughtn't=20 be done but might not or might be done. This means that environmental=20 ethicists admit outright that to the best of our knowledge it is with=20 human beings that the idea of at least active moral goodness and active=20 moral responsibility arises in the universe. Human moral goodness=20 depends on individual human initiative.=20 Does this show a hierarchical structure in nature? What we may=20 note is that some things do not invite evaluations at all---it is a=20 matter of no significance or of indifference whether some beings are or=20 are not or what they are or how they behave. Some beings invite=20 evaluation but without implying any active moral standing with reference=20 to whether they do well or badly. And some things---namely, human beings or their conduct---invite moral evaluation. Why is a being that invites moral ranking more valuable in nature than one that invites mere ranking? Why would the addition of the moral=20 component---one that involves the choosing capacity of the=20 agent---elevate the being with such a component in the scale of values in nature?=20 When evaluation---or value---involves beings that are not self-=20 determined, the capacity to contribute creatively to the values in nature is lacking. What human beings have the capacity to do is to create=20 value7, not just exhibit it. They can produce a culture of science, art, athletics, etc., the diverse features of which can themselves all exhibit value. So while nature's non-human living beings can have value, human=20 beings can create value as a matter of their own initiative. This would=20 enable human beings, for example, to replace some lost values in nature,=20 if that turned out to be the right course for them to take. So the=20 addition of choice---the moral component---to value clear makes a=20 valuable difference.=20 At this point one might object that simply because human beings=20 are capable of moral responsibility, it does not follow that they are the only beings of moral worth. But we need to keep in mind that "moral=20 worth" comes to. To ascribe moral worth or merit to something, or to=20 deny that it has such worth or merit, amounts to relating it to human=20 action from the start. A wonderful sunny day has no moral worth, an=20 destructive earthquake does not lack it. Morality involves beings with=20 the capacity to make choices. So something can have moral worth or lack=20 it only if some human (or other rational choosing) agent produced or=20 destroyed it. Thus the success of a symphony can have moral worth, just=20 as the failure of a saving and loan association may lack it (or even have moral disvalue), because human agency was involved in making it happen. Accordingly, the agents of moral worth can also have moral=20 worth---thus we consider men and women who produce morally good actions=20 and results as morally worthwhile. But we do not consider horses or=20 tidal waves either morally good or evil. It all has to do with the fact=20 that the concept "moral" or "ethical" arises from circumstances where=20 actions and results come about through the initiative of the agent. Does this show a hierarchical structure in nature? What we may=20 note is that some things do not invite evaluations at all---it is a=20 matter of no significance or of indifference whether some beings are or=20 are not or what they are or how they behave. Some beings invite=20 evaluation but without implying any active moral standing with reference=20 to whether they do well or badly. And some things---namely, human beings or their conduct---invite moral evaluation. =20 It might now be argued, in opposition to the above, that the fact that human beings have the capacity to create value on grounds that they=20 create science, art, etc., all of which have value. Does creating what=20 has value come to the same thing as creating value? It would seem that=20 this is the only sense we can make of "creating value"---since value is=20 inherently relational (meaning value is the abstract category of the=20 relationship of being of value to something). It is not confounding=20 value with having value to say this, since value and having value differ=20 only from the point of view of greater and lesser generality. X's having=20 value is, more broadly characterized, the phenomena of value in nature. =20 Nothing else works ---things are not just values, all alone, without=20 making contributions to something, being pleasing to or enhancing for or=20 supportive of something. After this brief defense of the superior value of human life, we=20 may note, also, that the level or degree of value moves from the=20 inanimate to the animate world, culminating, as far as we now know, with=20 human life. Normal human life involves moral and creative tasks, and=20 that is why we are, as a species, more valuable than other beings in=20 nature---we are subject to moral appraisal regarding all our creative=20 activities; it is a matter of our doing whether we succeed or fail in our lives.8=20 Now when it comes to our moral task, namely, to succeed as human=20 beings, we are dependent upon reaching justified conclusions about what=20 we should do and summoning the will to do it. What we will do, in turn,=20 often involves the transformation and utilization of the natural world of which we are a part. We have the moral responsibility to engage in the=20 needed transformation and utilization in a morally responsible fashion. =20 We can fail to do this and do so too often. But we can also succeed. =20 That, indeed, is once again implicit in the field of environmental=20 ethics. =20 The process that leads to our success involves learning what=20 nature contains with which we may achieve our highly varied tasks in=20 life, tasks that share the one common feature to make us good at living=20 our lives as our nature, including our individuality, requires. Among=20 these highly varied tasks could be some that makes judicious use of=20 nature's varied living beings, such as plants, animals, even others=20 people (under certain conditions)---for example, to discover whether some medicine may cure us of some illness, is safe for our use, we might wish=20 to use animals and plants. =20 Why would it be morally proper for us to make such use of=20 nature? Because we are unique in having to make choices for purposes of=20 doing well at living. We know from our study of the rest of the living=20 world that doing well at living is what it means, at least predominantly, to be good. Our evaluations in zoology, botany, biology, and medicine=20 makes this clear---the good is what is conducive and the bad is what is=20 destructive of living, mostly of the individual living being, even if at=20 times only in a complex fashion that may make it appear that individuals=20 as such do not count for much.9 So when we come to human life, the same=20 general standard remains in force, namely, pro-life versus anti-life;=20 only given the specifics of human nature, this will involve now a moral=20 dimension and whatever is requisite for that, including certain=20 sociopolitical principles. There are those, of course, who claim that=20 much if not all of what human beings invent so as to enhance their=20 existence is a kind of intrusion or trampling upon nature---unnatural or=20 artificial, in fact. But there is no good reason to suppose this. Human beings emerged in reality alongside all other living things, and their=20 activities---such as playing football, bowling, holding philosophy=20 conferences in pleasant surroundings, driving cars from the airport to=20 these surroundings, building tunnels, burning fossil fuels, cutting down=20 trees, etc.---could be just as natural as it is for the bee to make=20 honey, the swallow to fly south in winter time, or the beaver to dam up=20 creeks. Human life is a form of natural life. Whatever derives from its consistent development or realization will be in accordance with nature,=20 whatever subverts or corrupts it will not.=20 The major difference is, of course, something already mentioned,=20 namely, that human beings can mismanaged their lives, can (choose to)=20 subvert their nature. But what would amount to a subversion of human=20 nature? It would be to conduct oneself irrational, thoughtlessly,=20 imprudently, and by evading what is most healthy and productive for one's life. That is what amounts to living a vicious rather than virtuous=20 life. It is to fail to exercising one's unique capacity for coping with=20 one's life, a capacity that in the case of human beings must be exercised by choice. Thinking is not automatic---and, indeed, environmental=20 ethicists appear to assume this, implicitly, when they criticize failed=20 thinking and the resulting conduct in various areas of private behavior=20 and public policy. Indeed, ethics itself rests on the view that human=20 beings can choose---"ought implies can" embodies this point.=20 Within the parameters of these broad standards, a great deal of=20 the diverse things that human beings do can be perfectly natural, even=20 when it is destructive or---or rather transforms and utilizes---certain=20 other aspects of nature. (Notice that the frequently used phrase=20 "domination of nature" has something suspicious pejorative about it---it=20 suggests hostility and cruelty toward the rest of nature. Transformation and use do not have to involve dominance.)=20 The rational thing for us to do is to make the best use of nature for our success in living our lives. That does not mean there need be no guidelines involved in how we might make use of plants, animals,=20 etc.---any more than there need be no guidelines involved in how we make=20 use of objects of art, technology, etc. But it can easily involve=20 managing nature so as to serve our own goals and aspirations, to make=20 ourselves happy.=20 Why Individual Human Rights?=20 At this point we need to make an excursion into the realm of=20 politics and law. As already hinted, the peculiar value dimension of=20 human life, involving as it does moral choices all individuals will need=20 to make so as to succeed in living well, has socio-economic-political=20 implications. This involves the emergence of a normative realm known as=20 the domain of individual human rights.=20 Why do individual human rights come into this picture? The=20 rights being talked of in connection with human beings have as their=20 conceptual source the human capacity to make moral choices. For=20 instance, if (as has been argued in other forums 10), each of us has the=20 right to life, liberty and property---as well as more specialized rights=20 connected with politics, the press, religion---we do so because we have=20 as our central task in life to act morally and this task needs to be=20 shielded against intrusive actions from other moral agents. In order to=20 be able to engage in responsible and sound moral judgment and conduct=20 throughout the scope of our lives, we require a reasonably clear sphere=20 of personal jurisdiction---a dominion where we are sovereign and can=20 either succeed or fail to live well, to do right, to act properly.=20 If we did not have rights, we would not have such a sphere of=20 personal jurisdiction and there could be no clear idea as to whether we=20 are acting in our own behalf or those of other persons. A kind of moral=20 tragedy of the commons would ensue, with an indeterminate measure of=20 moral dumping and sharing without responsibility being assignable to=20 anyone for either.11 No one could be blamed or praised for we would not=20 know clearly enough whether what the person is doing is in his or her=20 authority to do or in someone else's. This is precisely the problem that arises in communal living and, especially, in totalitarian countries=20 where everything is under forced collective governance. The reason moral distinctions are still possible to make under such circumstances is that=20 in fact---as distinct from law---there is always some sphere of personal=20 jurisdiction wherein people may exhibit courage, prudence, justice,=20 honesty, and other virtues. But where collectivism has been success=20 fully enforced, there is no individual responsibility at play and=20 people's morality and immorality is submerged within the group.=20 Indeed the main reason for governments has for some time been=20 recognized to be nothing other than that our individual human rights=20 should be protected. In the past---and in many places even today--- it=20 was thought that government (or the State) has some kind of leadership=20 role in human communities. This belief followed the view that human=20 beings differ amongst themselves radically, some being lower, some higher class, some possessing divine rights, other lacking them, some having a=20 personal communion with God, other lacking this special advantage. With=20 such views in place, it made clear enough sense to argue that government=20 should have a patriarchal role in human communities---the view against=20 which John Locke argued his theory of natural individual human rights.12=20 Is there room for non-human rights?=20 A crucial implication of a non-anthropocentric environmental=20 ethics is the view that at least animals, if not plants, are as valuable=20 as human beings, possibly even to the extent that the law should=20 acknowledge animal rights and the legal standing of plants.13 There may=20 be other grounds for rejecting anthropocentrism but this one is certainly a significant aspect of the anti-anthropocentrist position or ethos.=20 We have seen that the most sensible and influential doctrine of=20 human rights rests on the purported fact that human beings are indeed=20 members of a discernibly different species. Central to what=20 distinguishes human beings from other animals is that they are moral=20 agents and thus have as their central objective in life to live morally=20 well, to uphold principles of right and wrong for them in their personal=20 lives and in communities. =20 Quite uncontroversially, there is no valid intellectual place for rights in the non-human world, the world in which moral responsibility is for all practical purposes absent. Some would want to argue that some=20 measure of morality can be found within the world of at least higher=20 animals---e.g., dogs. For example, Bernard Rollin holds that "In actual=20 fact, some animals even seem to exhibit behavior that bespeaks something=20 like moral agency or moral agreement."14=20 Rollin maintains that it is impossible to clearly distinguish=20 between human and non-human animals, including on the grounds of the=20 former's characteristic as a moral agent. Yet what they do to defend=20 this point is to invoke borderline cases, imaginary hypothesis, and=20 anecdotes. While such arguments are suggestive, they are bested by others defending the opposite viewpoint.=20 Perhaps the central point in support of animal rights is the view that no fundamental differences may be identified between human beings=20 and other animals. Yet, this is a mistake. Human individuals are indeed members of a distinct species of animals. Their human nature is a fact,=20 not merely a nominal category.15 No doubt many environmental ethicists sincerely believe that they have found a justification for opposing anthropocentrism. They seem to=20 hold that anthropocentrism means human beings exercising random,=20 capricious control over the rest of nature---trampling on the rest of the world as they desire. Yet many environmentalist might change their=20 perspective if they became convinced that anthropocentrism does not=20 endorse rapaciousness and is by no means in any inherent conflict with=20 the rational management of the environment. =20 Not only does a perspective that favors human life above all=20 appear to be better justified, as indicated in this discussion; as it=20 happens it also generates the most environmentally sound public policy. =20 Let's turn to this in the final section of this discussion.=20 Environmentalism and Politics =20 Of late no one can deny that collectivist political economies=20 have fallen into some disrepute. Theoretically there were hints of this=20 as far back as the 4th century B. C. when in the Politics Aristotle=20 observed that private ownership of property encourages responsible human=20 behavior more readily than does collectivism as spelled out in Plato's=20 Republic. Aristotle said, "That all persons call the same thing mine in the sense in which each does so may be a fine thing, but it is=20 impracticable; or if the words are taken in the other sense, such a unity in no way conduces to harmony. And there is another objection to the=20 proposal. For that which is common to the greatest number has the least=20 care bestowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at=20 all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an=20 individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfill; as in families=20 many attendants are often less useful than a few."16 In our time the same general observation was advanced in more=20 technical and rigorous terms by Ludwig von Mises, in his 1922 (German=20 edition) book Socialism17, although he was mainly concerned with economic problems of production and allocation of resources for satisfying=20 individual preferences. More recently, however, Garrett Hardin argued18=20 that the difficulties first noticed by Aristotle plague us in the context of our concerns with the quintessentially public realm, namely, the=20 ecological environment. =20 These various indictments19 of collectivism, coupled with the few moral arguments against it, didn't manage to dissuade many intellectuals=20 from the task of attempting to implement the system. Our own century is=20 filled with enthusiastic, stubborn, visionary, opportunistic but almost=20 always bloody efforts to implement the collectivist dream. Not until the crumpling of the Soviet attempt, in the form of its Marxist-Leninist=20 internationalist socialist revolution, did it dawn on most people that=20 collectivism is simply not going to do the job of enabling people to live a decent human social life. Although most admit that in small=20 units---convents, kibbutzes, the family---a limited, temporary=20 collectivist arrangement may be feasible, they no longer look with much=20 hope toward transforming entire societies into collectivist human=20 organizations. =20 The most recent admission of the failure of economic=20 collectivism---in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet bloc economy=20 (something most enthusiast would not expect based on the kind of=20 predictions advanced by Mises and F. A. Hayek)---comes from Professor=20 Robert Heilbroner, one of socialism's most intelligent and loyal=20 champions for the last several decades. As he puts it in his recent=20 essay, "After Communism": "...Ludwig von Mises...had written of the=20 "impossibility" of socialism, arguing that no Central Planning Board=20 could ever gather the enormous amount of information needed to create a=20 workable economic system....It turns out, of course, that Mises was=20 right...."20=20 But, not unlike previous thinkers who have seen various examples=20 of the failure of some kind of perfectionist, idealist normative moral or political scheme, Heilbroner cannot quite say good bye to his utopia. He notes that there are two ways it may remain something of a handy=20 concept. First, it may leave us piecemeal social objectives to strive=20 for---but these have always come in the context of essentially capitalist economics systems. Secondly, it may reemerge as the adjunct of the=20 ecological movement. As Heilbroner puts it,=20 [If] there is any single problem that will have to be faced by any=20 socioeconomic order over the coming decades it is the problem of making=20 our economic peace with the demands of the environment. Making that peace means insuring that the vital processes of material provisioning do not=20 contaminate the green-blue film on which life itself depends. This=20 imperative need not affect all social formations, but none so profoundly=20 as capitalism.21 =20 What is one to say about this new fear, a new problem allegedly=20 too complicated for free men and women to handle? Has Heilbroner not=20 heard of the "tragedy of the commons" so that he could imagine the=20 environmental difficulties that face the collectivist social systems? =20 Here is how Heilbroner issues the "new" warning:=20 It is, perhaps, possible that some of the institutions of=20 capitalism---markets, dual realms of power, even private ownership of=20 some kind of production---may be adapted to that new state of ecological=20 vigilance, but, if so, they must be monitored, regulated, and contained=20 to such a degree that it would be difficult to call the final social=20 order capitalism.22 =20 This somewhat novel but essentially old fashioned skepticism=20 about free market capitalism needs to be addressed.=20 My first response is that there is no justification for any of=20 this distrust of "the market," as opposed to trusting some scientific=20 bureaucracy that is to do the monitoring, regulating, and containing=20 Heilbroner and so many other champions of regimentation are calling for. Such distrust tends to arise from comparing the market system to some=20 ideal and static construct developed in the mind of a theorist. But=20 since human community life is dynamic, the most we can hope for in=20 improving it is the establishment of certain basic principles of law, or=20 a constitution, that will keep the dynamics of the community within=20 certain bounds.23 Accordingly, put plainly, if men and women acting in the market=20 place, guided by the rule of law based on their natural individual rights to life, liberty and property, were incapable of standing up to the=20 ecological challenges Heilbroner and many others in the environmentalist=20 movement have in mind, there is no reasonable doubt that those could not=20 be met better by some new statist means.24 Why should ecologically=20 minded bureaucrats be better motivated, more competent, and more virtuous than those motivated by a concern for the hungry, the unjustly treated,=20 the poor, the artistically deprived, the uneducated masses or the workers of the world? There is no reason to attribute to the members of any=20 ecological politburo or central committee more noble characteristics than to the rest of those individuals who have made a try at coercing people=20 into good behavior throughout human history.=20 As already suggested, lamentations about capitalism tend to rest=20 on a kind of idealism that is ill suited to the formation of public=20 policy for a dynamic human community. One might be able to imagine---in=20 a Platonic sort of fashion, vis-a-vis the ideal state---a perfectly=20 functioning ecological order. It is doubtful that even this much is=20 possible. It is another thing entirely to attempt to implement policies=20 that will produce such an idealized order in the actual world. What we=20 actually face in our various human communities is a choice between what=20 we may call live options, e.g., capitalism, socialism, the welfare state, fascism, etc. No ideal system is a contender and it is folly to compare=20 any of the live options to such an ideal. In the actual contest, in=20 turn, it seems the capitalist alternative is superior for reasons already alluded to and discussed elsewhere.25 Yet it will help to sketch some=20 central aspects of that alternative.=20 In the first place, if human beings have the right to private=20 property, not to mention their lives and liberty, a just legal system=20 would prohibit any kind of dumping by one person on another, including=20 all environmental assaults such as transmitting toxic substances unto=20 unsuspecting victims, polluting public realms, seepage, etc. Beyond a=20 harmless level of waste disposal, no pollution would be legal, no matter=20 whether jobs or the achievement of any other laudable purpose depended on it. Just as slavery may not be practiced regardless of how it might=20 facilitate certain valued objectives, just as rape is impermissible no=20 matter how desperate one may be, so too may pollution and other forms of=20 environmental offenses not be carried out regardless of the various=20 possible valued objectives the pursuit of which would generate it. To=20 put the matter into the language of the economists, if one cannot=20 internalize the negative externalities associated with some production or transportation process, one will simply have to stop it.=20 There are, of course, technical problems associated with=20 measuring how much waste disposal constitutes reaching the threshold. =20 But this is in principle no different from determining how much of some=20 food substance or medicine constitutes poison. Just as the criminal law=20 employs forensic science to determine who is guilty of what degree of=20 homicide, so various branches of environmental science would be utilized=20 so as to establish culpability in environmental crime.=20 The worry that industrial civilization would be slowed to a dead=20 halt by the above approach is unfounded. Alternative technologies to=20 those that involve environmental assault will certainly emerge and are=20 already on the way. Past errors, of course, cannot be fully remedied,=20 yet some of what has been wrought upon us by way of the highly subsidized internal combustion engine could be mitigated by imposing full cost on=20 transportation, not permitting owners of vehicles to dump on those whose=20 permission they do not have or cannot obtain.=20 In general, then, clearly the anthropocentric---i.e., individual=20 rights---oriented environmental ethics and law is more radical and just=20 than anything offered within standard environmental ethics literature. =20 If free men and women will not manage the environment, nor will=20 anyone else. In any case, more optimism about the capacity of free=20 citizens to deal with this issue is warranted when we examine just what=20 are the sources of our ecological troubles. Given, especially, the fact=20 of collectivism's far greater mismanagement of the environment than that=20 of the mixed economies we loosely label capitalist, there is already some suggestion implicit here about what the problem comes to, namely, too=20 little free market capitalism. Given the comparatively worse=20 environmental situation evident in political economies that rely on=20 collective ownership and management, and given the natural individualism=20 of human life, free markets appear to be more suited to solving the=20 tragedy of the commons. What Heilbroner and friends fail to realize is=20 that the environmental problems most people are concerned about are due=20 to the tragedy of the commons, not due to the privatization of resources=20 and the implementation of the principles that prohibit dumping and other=20 kinds of trespassing. With more attention to protecting individual=20 rights to life, liberty and property, solutions to our problems are more=20 likely, period. =20 The best defense of the free market approach to environmentalism=20 in matters of public policy beings with the realization that it is the=20 nature of human beings to be essentially individual. This can be put=20 alternatively by saying that the individual rights approach is most=20 natural---it most readily accommodates nature and, therefore, the=20 ecology. =20 If there is a crisis here, it amounts to the history of human=20 action that has been out of line with ecological well being, health,=20 flourishing. But how do we know what kinds of human action might have=20 been more or less conducive to ecological well-being? It will not do to=20 speculate on some ideal configuration of the living world, apart from=20 considering what is best for human individuals. There simply is no=20 standard of a right pattern to which the world should be made to=20 conform---it is a dynamic system of living entities, with no final=20 pattern discernible in it to which the current configuration should be=20 adjusted. Indeed, if there is something we have learned about=20 environmental wisdom, it is that the environment's health, so to speak,=20 emerges spontaneously, reflecting something of a chaotic development, one that is not predictable. We need first of all to know about human nature---what it is that human beings are and what this implies for their conduct within the=20 natural world. If, as the natural rights (classical liberal) tradition=20 invoked here would have it, human beings are individuals with basic=20 rights to life, liberty and property, that also implies, very generally=20 at first, that this is how they are best fitted within the natural world, within the rest of nature. Environmentalism is most effectively promoted=20 if we trust free men and women with the task of choosing the best=20 policies bearing on the same, not relying on governments to determine the most suitable relationship various individuals and organizations should=20 cultivate with the rest of nature. Not that this will serve to avoid all failings vis-a-vis this area of human concern---anymore than leaving=20 human beings free to choose in other spheres creates utopia. =20 Nevertheless, when we consider that governments are administered by=20 persons with no greater claim to virtue and wisdom than others can make,=20 and if we also consider that officials of the government make their=20 mistakes, when they do, without the chance of full accountability and=20 with the benefit of the legal use of force, it is not at all unreasonable to suppose that when problems need solutions, governments are not going=20 to be the most useful for this purpose unless their particular means of=20 dealing with persons, force, is required.=20 Last Reflections=20 The fact is that with human nature a problem arose in nature that had not been there before---basic choices had to be confronted, which=20 other animals do not have to confront. The question "How should I live?" faces each human being but not other living things, not to mention=20 inanimate nature. And that is what makes it unavoidable for human beings to dwell on moral issues as well as to see other human beings as having=20 the same problem to solve, the same question to dwell on. For this=20 reason we are very different from other living beings, plants and=20 animals---we also do terrible, horrible, awful things to each other as=20 well as to the rest of nature, but we can also do much, much better and=20 achieve incredible feats nothing else in nature can come close to. =20 Yet, merely because we do have a moral dimension in our lives, it does not follow that we must agonize about everything in nature, as if we had the moral capacity to remake the entire universe.=20 Indeed, then, the moral life is the exclusive province of human=20 beings, so far as we can tell for now. Other, lower---i.e., less=20 important or valuable---animals simply cannot be accorded---because they=20 have no requirement for---the kind of treatment that such a moral life=20 demands, namely, respect for and protection of basic rights. =20 As such it is to human life we must, rationally considered,=20 attribute the greatest value in the universe. And since human life is=20 essentially individual, not collective---which does not preclude its=20 vital social yet largely voluntary dimension---the individual rights=20 approach, that protects each person as a moral agent and provides for him or her a sphere of privacy or exclusive jurisdiction, is the most=20 sensible environmentalist public policy. ENDNOTES: 1 In this paper no distinction will be made between "important" and "valuable." In some other context the difference between the=20 meanings of these two terms may be significant but it is not for present=20 purposes. Both terms are used to mean making a positive or advantageous=20 difference to something or someone---e.g., the sun is important for the=20 plant or the house is one of John's valuable possessions.=20 2 "Individual" does not have to translate to "atomistic,=20 isolated, anti-social, asocial." Such a translation begs the question=20 as to what kind of individual we are faced with. For a detailed=20 discussion of the type of individual a human being is, see Tibor R. =20 Machan, Capitalism and Individualism, Reframing the Argument for the =20 Free Society (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).=20 A different sort of defense of anthropocentrism is advanced in=20 Thomas Palmer, "The Case for Human Beings," The Atlantic, 269 (January=20 1992): 83-88. Palmer notes that "in fact Homo sapiens is the crown of=20 creation, if by creation we mean the explosion of earthly vitality and=20 particularity long ago ignited by a weak solution of amino acids mixing=20 in sunlit waters" (p. 88). Unfortunately, Palmer does not emphasize=20 enough this feature of particularity in his defense and, thus, ignores=20 the bulk of the important political and policy issues that arise in=20 environmentalism. 3 Here a point needs to be raised concerning the perfectly=20 sensible Aristotelian understanding of human beings as essentially social animals. Ecologists tend to stress this point often when individualism=20 is presented to them as a sociopolitical alternative to their widely=20 embraced collectivism (whether in a socialist, welfare statist, or=20 communitarian version). Being essentially an individual does not preclude have also an=20 essential social dimension to one's life. Briefly, although one makes=20 for oneself a given, particular but human life, given that such a life=20 has much to benefit from social involvement, it could well be "in one's=20 nature" to be social as well as a matter of one's individual decision to=20 embark on a rich social, community and political life. It may well be=20 one's moral responsibility as an individual to connect with other human=20 beings---unless, of course, the available others are real dangers to=20 one's life, which in the case of human beings is a clear possibility. 4 The source of this remark has alluded me since originally=20 located in one of Comte's works. 5 There are many who believe that when one construes human=20 beings as essential individual, this means that they are "individual=20 through and through." Yet something that is essentially=20 individual---that is, the nature of which is such that its individuality=20 cannot be omitted from understanding it---can also be elaborately=20 involved with community, society, family, and other groups of=20 individuals. It is, furthermore, an exaggeration indeed to say that, to=20 cite an anonymous commentator on an earlier version of this paper, "life=20 as studied by the life sciences is thoroughly social in nature with=20 individual organisms embedded in interconnected supporting webs on which=20 they are entirely dependent." Apart from the fact that being dependent=20 on "supporting webs" does not render some being "thoroughly social"---so=20 that, for example, the mere dependence of a Rembrandt, List, Chekhov or=20 Keats on innumerable social webs (economic, manufacturing, political,=20 familiar, artistic, etc.) by no means deprives him of the capacity to=20 inject into his art a decisive individuality. See, for more on this,=20 Conway Zirkle, "Some Biological Aspects of Individualism," in F. Morley,=20 ed., Essays on Individualism (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 1977), pp. 53-86. See, also, Theodosus Dobzhansky, The Biological Basis of Human=20 Freedom (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956). If, as has been=20 argued by Roger W. Sperry, Science and Moral Priority (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), human beings have a naturally grounded capacity=20 for self-determination---i.e., free will---it makes eminently good sense=20 that they should become individuated depending on the extend and=20 intensity of their choice to exercise their will. Their choices are then indeed their own, sovereign choices, not explainable without remainder by other aspects of their nature, including their social entanglements. 6 Stephen R. L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford,=20 England: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 13. "Uniquely important" means that=20 the being in question is unique in its being important, whereas saying=20 "most important or valuable" does not preclude the value of other beings=20 not just in their relationship to what is uniquely important---i.e.,=20 derivatively---but to themselves, in terms of their own nature. 7 It might be argued that this point assumes anthropocentrism=20 but it does not---we are not just talking about human beings creating=20 values for themselves but values as such. For example, human beings=20 breed animals and plants, they create provisions for the same, they=20 protect or enhance the lives of non-human beings. They create values=20 more abundantly than does anything else, although, of course, they also=20 destroy values a plenty. 8 It might be objected here that this line of argumentation=20 assumes away the troublesome "is/ought" gap, moving illegitimately from=20 fact to value, etc. It isn't possible to deal with the matter here but=20 see Tibor R. Machan, Individuals and Their Rights (LaSalle, IL: Open=20 Court Publ., Co., Inc., 1989), Chapter 2. The central point is that=20 value is a type of fact attending to living beings for whom the=20 alternative between flourishing and perishing is natural. What is value=20 contributes to flourishing and what is of disvalue contributes to=20 perishing, to put it into very general terms. I draw here on an idea=20 developed in Ayn Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of=20 Selfishness, A New Concept of Egoism (New York: New American Library,=20 1961). See, also, Karl Popper, Unending Quest (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1974), p. 194: "I think that values enter the world with life; and if=20 there is life without consciousness (as I think there may well be, even=20 in animals and man, for there appears to be such a thing as dreamless=20 sleep) then, I suggest, there will also be objective values, even without consciousness." 9 The case for "altruism" in the animal world is widely=20 debated but by no means settled. I rest my own reflections on this on the view that whatever version of "altruism" may be accepted, in the last=20 analysis it is individual living beings that would benefit from it, aside from their species. For more on this, see James G. Lennox, "Philosophy=20 of Biology," in Members of the Department of History and Philosophy of=20 Science, University of Pittsburgh, Introduction to the Philosophy of=20 Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1992), p. 295. 10 Tibor R. Machan, Human Rights and Human Liberties (Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall Co., 1975) and Individuals and Their Rights. See, also,=20 Machan, "A Reconsideration showing that the dumping of externalities is=20 to be treated as a crime (assault, trespassing, etc.) may be found in=20 Tibor R. Machan, Private Rights, Public Illusions (New Brunswick, NJ:=20 Transaction Books, 1993). The essence of this approach is that if one is unable to conduct=20 one's activities---productive, recreational, etc.---in a fashion that=20 does not impose uninvited burdens on third parties---i.e., to use the=20 economist's jargon, if one is unable to internalize one's negative=20 externalities---one simply may not carry forth with them. Full cost of=20 such production must lie with the agent and no unwelcome "free" rides may be taken. In contrast to standard approaches to solving environmental=20 problems caused by human beings, namely, via the establishment of=20 government regulatory agencies (which are beset with all the "public=20 choice" and "tragedy of the commons" problems, especially in democratic=20 welfare states), here the issue of one of criminal law and dumpers, just=20 as trespassers, assaulters, rapists, arsonists, and the like, would be=20 prosecuted. If someone with AIDS negligently or intentionally infects=20 another who has not had the chance to exercise free choice in the matter, the perpetrator is prosecuted under the criminal law. Anyone with a=20 serious contagious disease exposing others to his or her illness would=20 suffer the same fate. There is no government regulation---rationing=20 involved here, only prohibition and the conviction of violators. No=20 doubt, complexities attend all of this, yet there seems to be nothing=20 extraordinarily difficult about determination of threshold levels and=20 prosecution of those who dump once the threshold has been reached. The=20 individual rights approach is simply stricter than the utilitarian,=20 social (risk) cost-benefit approach, yet the same science and technology=20 can be employed in administering both systems. 25 See op. cit., Machan, Individuals and Their Rights. See,=20 also, Tibor Machan, Private Rights, Public Illusions (New Brunswick, NJ:=20 Transaction Books, forthcoming). 26 See, Stephen Jay Gould, Wonderful Life (New York: W. W.=20 Norton, 1989).