>Date: Thu, 20 Jul 1995 14:34:38 -0500 (CDT) >From: Tibor R Machan >Subject: Free Will Text [Appeared, in different form, in THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1993), 59-72 ("Applied Ethics and Free Will, Some Untoward Results of Independence")] A Brief Defense of Free Will Tibor R. Machan The Importance of having Free Will This is not a common topic of discussion outside the discipline of=20 philosophy and some other fields. Nevertheless, political economy is=20 related to this philosophical problem in more ways than one. For=20 example, if, say, a certain system of law is just, it is implied that we=20 ought to implement it - even if only gradually, over time. If we claim=20 that aggression or government regulation of business or censorship of the= Internet is wrong, we implicitly hold that people ought to refrain from=20 it. Indeed, even to say that some argument concerning any topic from=20 logic to astronomy is unsound, we are claiming, implicitly, that one=20 ought not to propose or accept it. =20 But as the philosopher Immanuel Kant pointed out, "ought implies=20 can." That means, in part, that only if it is possible to choose to do,= originate or initiate something can it be the case that it ought (not) to= be done. So the very meaningfulness of the advocacy of political ideals=20 implies that free will exists. (The other meaning of "ought implies=20 can" is that some objective standard of human conduct must be=20 identifiable, otherwise one could never do what one ought to do or even=20 have a clear meaning of the "ought" involved.) Some hold, no doubt, that noting about free will is implied in talk=20 about morality - they have a view of morality that I call "value=20 theoretical," concerned not with what anyone ought to do but what is=20 good, bad, etc., however human beings may or may not be able to relate to= them. (Many utilitarians care little about the free will issue because=20 they tend to be concerned about the value of the results of behavior, not= with what people ought to do and whether what they ought to do is=20 something possible for them to do.) Also, there are some kind of=20 compatibilist theses whereby it doesn't matter to the meaningful of moral= discourse whether we have free will. I have never been able to figure out how these views can=20 flourish. It seems plain enough that if, as Clarence Darrow argued=20 vis-a-vis the Leopold and Loeb cases, that no one has free will, then no=20 one can do anything other than what he or she does and there is no moral=20 blame or praise and regret and apology, other than in some insubstantial,= epiphenomenal sense, perhaps. One may lament what goes on or happened,=20 but one will, if honest, see that that's all that could have happened. =20 There is nothing in human beings enabling them to make bona fide choices,= where at a given time, given everything else being equal, they have the=20 alternative between doing A or B, even A or not-A (e.g., walk or run or=20 kill or not kill). This paper is not addressed to those who are=20 perfectly happy with talking about what people out and out not to do but=20 find nothing about that that raises the issue of free will, the=20 possibility of human beings initiating some of their conduct. But it is of some value to explore briefly whether human beings have= free will, to look at the pros and cons, just to clear on what the=20 options are. This is true at least for those, like myself, who have no=20 idea how morality would be possible if bona fide choice or initiative=20 didn't exist. In connection with the particular principles of classical=20 liberalism, the issue of why respecting individual rights is vital and=20 possible relates to the problem of free will. =20 Individual rights need to be respected and protected because we must= have an area of personal responsibility within which to make our choices=20 about our lives or wherein to initiate our own actions. The need for=20 this kind of respect assumes, again, that human beings have free will,=20 that they can make basic choices about their lives, initiate some of=20 their conduct, that can turn out to be right or wrong. =20 Furthermore, requiring of people that they respect individual rights= also assumes that they possess free will. Otherwise it would make no=20 sense to require such respect from them: something they have no choice=20 about cannot be something they morally ought to and can fail to do. But there is also the more familiar matter of the issue of personal=20 responsibility concerning everyday conduct, those matters discussed daily= in the home, in the press, and on the various media. Not only is there=20 the issue of who is responsible for various good and bad things, but=20 there is also the question of whether most of us are, as so many people=20 seem to believe, in the grips of various forces over which we have no=20 control. This or that addiction - to drugs, sex, violence, power,=20 athletics, or work - is supposed to be our master, with ourselves merely=20 puppets on strings moved about by them. =20 Yet, only if we have free will does any talk of blaming our parents,= politicians, the rich, bureaucrats and the rest make sense. But there=20 are many people who believe that modern science, including, of course,=20 all the social sciences, leave no room for such a thing in human life. =20 Where does it stand, then, with the free will issue? It seems to me=20 worth discussing this topic outside the confines of philosophy graduate=20 seminars and encourage some thinking about it on everyone's part. After=20 all, it is a central feature of the political philosophy of liberty that=20 individual citizens in society must not be thwarted in making choices for= themselves, in initiating their own thinking and conduct. What does this= come to unless they possess free will, the capacity to produce their own=20 behavior? I want to argue that there is indeed free will. And I'm going to=20 defend the position that free will means that human beings can cause some= of what they do, on their own; in other words, what they do is not=20 explainable solely by references to factors that have influenced them,=20 though, of course, their range of options is clearly circumscribed by the= world in which they live, by their particular circumstances, capacities,=20 options, talents, etc. My thesis, in other words, is that human beings=20 are able to cause their actions and they are therefore responsible for=20 some of what they do. In a basic sense we are all are original actors=20 capable of making novel moves in the world. We are, in other words,=20 initiators of some of our behavior. =20 The first matter to be noted is that this view is in now way in=20 contradiction to science. Free will is a natural phenomenon, something=20 that emerged in nature with the emergence of human beings, with their=20 kind of minds, namely, minds that can think and be aware of their own=20 thinking. =20 Nature is complicated and multifaceted. It includes many different=20 sorts of things and one of these is human beings. Such beings exhibit=20 one unique yet natural attribute that other things apparently do not=20 exhibit and that is free will. =20 I am going to offer eight reasons why a belief in free will makes=20 very good sense. Four of these explain why there can be free will -=20 i.e., why nature does not preclude it. But these do not yet demonstrate=20 that free will exists. That will be the job of the four reasons I will=20 advance next, which will establish that free will actually exists, it's=20 not just a possibility but an actuality. =20 Nature's Laws versus Free Will First, one of the major objections against free will is that nature=20 is governed by a set of laws, mainly the laws of physics. Everything is=20 controlled by these laws and we human beings are basically more=20 complicated versions of material substances and that therefore whatever=20 governs any other material substance in the universe must also govern=20 human life. Basically, we are subject to the kind of causation=20 everything else is. Since nothing else exhibits free will but conforms=20 to causal laws, so must we be. Social science is merely looking into the= particulars of those causes, but we all know that we are subject to them=20 in any case. The only difference is that we are complicated things, not=20 that we are not governed by the same principles or laws of nature. Now, in response I want to point out that nature exhibits=20 innumerable different domains, distinct not only in their complexity but=20 also in the kinds of beings they include. So it is not possible to rule=20 out ahead of time that there might be something in nature that exhibits=20 agent causation. This is the phenomenon whereby a thing causes some of=20 its own behavior. So there might be in nature a form of existence that=20 exhibits free will. Whether there is or is not is something to be=20 discovered, not ruled out by a narrow metaphysics that restricts=20 everything to being just a variation on just one kind of thing. Thus,=20 taking account of what nature is composed of does not at all rule out=20 free will. Yet, simply because of the possibility that there is free=20 will, there may still not be. We consider that a bit later. Can we Know of Free Will? Now, another reason why some think that free will is not possible is= that the dominant mode of studying, inspecting or examining nature is=20 what we call "empiricism. " In other words, many believe that the only=20 way we know about nature is we observe it with our various sensory=20 organs. But since the sensory organs do not give us direct evidence of=20 such a thing as free will, there really isn't any such thing. Since no=20 observable evidence for free will exists, therefore free will does not=20 exist. =20 But the doctrine that empiricism captures all forms of knowing is=20 wrong - many things that we know not simply through observation but=20 through a combination of observation, inferences, and theory=20 construction. (Consider, even the purported knowledge that empiricism is= our form of knowledge is not "known" empirically!) For one, many features of the universe, including criminal guilt,=20 are detected without eyewitnesses but by way of theories which serve the=20 purpose of best explaining what we do have before us to observe. This is= true, also, even in the natural sciences. Many of the phenomena or facts= in biology, astrophysics, subatomic physics, botany, chemistry - not to=20 mention psychology - consist of not what we see or detect by observation=20 but that is inferred by way of a theory. And the theory that explains=20 things best - most completely and most consistently - is the best answer=20 to the question as to what is going on. =20 Free will may well turn out to be in this category. In other words,= free will may not be something that we can see directly, but what best=20 explains what we do see in human life. This may include, for example,=20 the many mistakes that human beings make in contrast to the few mistakes=20 that other animals make. We also notice that human beings do all kinds=20 of odd things that cannot be accounted for in terms of mechanical=20 causation, the type associated with physics. We can examine a person's=20 background and find that some people with bad childhoods turn out to be=20 decent, whole others crooks. And free will comes as a very helpful=20 explanation. For now all we need to consider that this may well be so,=20 and if empiricism does not allow for it, so much the worse for=20 empiricism. One could know something because it explains something else=20 better than any alternative. And that is not strict empirical=20 knowledge. =20 Is Free Will Weird? Another matter that very often counts against free will is that the=20 rest beings in nature do not exhibit it. Dogs, cats, lizards, fish,=20 frogs, etc., have no free will and therefore it appears arbitrary to=20 impute it to human beings. Why should we be free to do things when in=20 the rest of nature lacks any such capacity? It would be an impossible=20 aberration.=20 The answer here is similar to what I gave earlier. To wit, there is= enough variety in nature - some things swim, some fly, some just lie=20 there, some breathe, some grow, while others do not; so there is plenty=20 of evidence of plurality of types and kinds of things in nature. =20 Discovering that something has free will could be yet another addition to= all the varieties of nature. =20 Let us now consider whether free will actually does exist. I'm=20 going to offer four arguments in support of an affirmative answer. Are We Determined to be Determinists - or not? There is an argument against determinism to the effect that, if we=20 are fully determined in what we think, believe, and do, then of course=20 the belief that determinism is true is also a result of this=20 determinism. But the same holds for the belief that there determinism is= false. There is nothing you can do about whatever you believe - you had=20 to believe it. There is no way to take an independent stance and=20 consider the arguments unprejudiced because all various forces making us=20 assimilate the evidence in the world just the way we do. One either=20 turns out to be a determinist or not and in neither case can we appraise=20 the issue objectively because we are predetermined to have a view on the=20 matter one way or the other. =20 But then, paradoxically, we'll never be able to resolve this debate,= since there is no way of obtaining an objective assessment. Indeed, the=20 very idea of scientific or judicial objectivity, as well as of ever=20 reaching philosophical truth, has to do with being free. Thus, if we're=20 engaged in this enterprise of learning about truth and distinguishing it=20 from falsehood, we are committed to the idea that human beings have some=20 measure of mental freedom. =20 Should We Become Determinists? There's another dilemma of determinism. The determinist wants us to= believe in determinism. In fact, he believes we ought to be determinists= rather than believe in this myth called "free will". But, as the saying=20 goes in philosophy, "ought" implies "can". That is, if one ought to=20 believe in or do something, this implies that one has a choice in the=20 matter; it implies that we can make a choice as to whether determinism or= the free will is a better doctrine. That, then, it assumes that we are=20 free. In other words, even arguing for determinism assumes that we are=20 not determined to believe in free will or determined but that it is a=20 matter of our making certain choices about arguments, evidence, and=20 thinking itself. That's a paradox which troubles a deterministic position. We Often Know We Are Free! In many contexts of our lives introspective knowledge is taken very=20 seriously. When you go to a doctor and he asks you, "Are you in pain?"=20 and you say, "Yes," and he says "Where is the pain?" and you say, "It's=20 in my knee," the doctor doesn't say, "Why, you can't know, this is not=20 public evidence, I will now get verifiable, direct evidence where you=20 hurt." In fact your evidence is very good evidence. Witnesses at trials= give evidence as they report about what they have seen, which is=20 introspective evidence: "This indeed is what I have seen or heard." =20 Even in the various sciences people report on what they've read on=20 surveys or seen on gauges or instruments. Thus they are giving us=20 introspective evidence. Introspection is one source of evidence that we take as reasonably=20 reliable. So what should we make of the fact that a lot of people do say= things like, "Damn it, I didn't make the right choice," or "I neglected=20 to do something." They report to us that they have made various=20 choices, decisions, etc., that they intended this or that but not another= thing. And they often blame themselves for not having done something,=20 thus they report that they are taking responsibility for what they have=20 or haven't done. =20 In short, there is a lot of evidence from people all around us of=20 the existence of free choice. =20 Modern Science Discovers Free Will! Finally, there is also the evidence of the fact that we do seem to=20 have the capacity for self-monitoring. The human brain has a kind of=20 structure that allows us to, so to speak, to govern ourselves. We can=20 inspect our lives, we can detect where we're going, and we can,=20 therefore, change course. And the human brain itself makes it possible. = The brain, because of its structure, can monitor itself and as a result=20 we can decide whether to continue in a certain pattern or to change that=20 pattern and go in a different direction. That is the sort of free will=20 that is demonstrable. At least some scientists, for example Roger W.=20 Sperry - in his book Science and Moral Priority (Columbia University=20 Press, 19983) and in numerous more technical articles - maintain that=20 there's evidence for free will in this sense. This view depends on a=20 number of points I have already mentioned. It assumes that there can be=20 different causes in nature, so that the functioning of the brain would=20 not be a kind of self-causation. The brain as a system would have to be=20 able to cause some things about the organism's behavior and that depends,= of course, on the possibility of there being various kinds of causes. =20 Precisely the sort of thing Sperry thinks possible is evident in our= lives. We make plans and revise them. We explore alternatives and decide= to follow one of these. We change a course of conduct we have embarked=20 upon, or continue with it. In other words, there is a locus of=20 individual self responsibility that is evident in the way in which we=20 look upon ourselves, and the way in which we in fact behave. =20 Some People are, some are not Determined. There clearly are cases of conduct in which some persons behave as=20 they do because they were determined to do so by certain identifiable=20 forces outside of their own control. A brain tumor, a severe childhood=20 trauma or some other intrusive force sometimes incapacitates people. =20 This is evident in those occasional cases when a person who engaged in=20 criminal behavior is shown to have had no control over what he or she=20 did. Someone who actually had no capacity to control his or her=20 behavior, could not control his or her own thinking or judgment and was,=20 thus, moved by something other than his own will, cannot be said to=20 possess a bona fide free will. Those who deny that we have free will simply cannot make sense of=20 our distinction between cases in which one controls one's behavior and=20 those in which one is being moved by forces over which he or she has no=20 control. When we face the latter sort of case, we still admit that the=20 behavior could be good or bad but we deny that it is morally and legally=20 significant - it is more along lines of acts of nature or God by being=20 out of the agent's control. This is also why philosophers who discuss=20 ethics but deny free will have trouble distinguishing between morality=20 and value theory - e.g., utilitarians, Marxists. The Best Theory is True. Finally, there what I have alluded to earlier, namely, that when we=20 put all of this together we get a more sensible understanding of the=20 complexities of human life than otherwise - we get a better=20 understanding, for example, of why social engineering and government=20 regulation and regimentation do not work, why there are so many=20 individual and cultural differences, why people can be wrong, why they=20 can disagree with each other, etc. It is because they are free to do so,= because they are not set in some pattern the way cats and dogs and=20 orangutans and birds tend to be.=20 In principle, all of the behavior of these creatures around us can=20 be predicted because they are not creative in a sense that they originate= new ideas and behavior, although we do not always know enough about the=20 constitution of these beings and how it would interact with their=20 environment to actually predict what they will do. Human beings produce=20 new ideas and these can introduce new kinds of behavior in familiar=20 situations. This, in part, is what is meant by the fact that different=20 people often interpret their experiences differently. Yet, we can make=20 some predictions about what people will do because they often do make up=20 their minds in a given fashion and stick to their decision over time. =20 This is what we mean when we note that people make commitments, possess=20 integrity, etc. So we can estimate what they are going to do. But even=20 then we do not make certain predictions but only statistically=20 significant ones. Clearly, very often people change their minds and=20 surprise or annoy us. And, if we go to different cultures, they'll=20 surprise us even more. This complexity, diversity, and individuation=20 about human beings is best explained if human beings are free than if=20 they are determined. Is Free Will Well Founded?. So these several reasons provide a kind of argumentative collage in=20 support of the free will position. Can anyone do better with this=20 issue? I don't know. I think it's best to ask only for what is the best= of the various competing theories. Are human beings doing what they do=20 solely as the consequences of forces acting on them? Or do they have the= capacity to take charge of their lives, often neglect to do so properly=20 or effectively, make stupid choices? Which supposition explains the=20 human world and its complexities around us? I think the latter makes much better sense. It explains, much=20 better than do deterministic theories, how it is possible that human life= involves such wide range of possibilities, accomplishments as well as=20 defeats, joys as well as sorrows, creation as well as destruction. It=20 explains, also, why in human life there is so much change - in language,=20 custom, style, art, and science. Unlike other living beings, for which=20 what is possible is pretty much fixed by instincts and reflexes - even if= some extraordinary behavior may be elicited, by way of extensive in=20 laboratories or, at times, in the face of unusual natural developments -=20 people initiate much of what they do, for better and for worse. From=20 their most distinctive capacity of forming ideas and theories, to those=20 of artistic and athletic inventiveness, human beings remake the world=20 without so to speak having to do so! And this can make good sense if we=20 understand them to have the distinctive capacity for initiating their own= conduct rather than relying on mere stimulation and reaction. It also=20 poses for them certain very difficult tasks, not the least of them is=20 that they cannot expect that any kind of formula or system is going to=20 predictably manage the future of human affairs, such as some of social=20 science seems to hope it will. Social engineering is, thus, not a=20 genuine prospect for solving human problems - only education and=20 individual initiative can do that.