>Date: Sun, 5 Nov 1995 22:40:53 -0600 (CST) >From: Tibor R Machan >To: LibertProfessors >Subject: Essay on Military Intervention Some of you might be interested my attached piece on the ethics of military intervention, published (slightly cut) in THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER on Friday, Nov. 3. Tibor Machan On the Morality of Military Intervention Tibor R. Machan The leaders of the Balkan countries are meeting this week in the United States to explore ways to reach some kind of peaceful agreement and there is now serious talk about the United States sending troops into the region so as to facilitate the maintenance of the peace that is to e achieved. On this occasion I would like to advance some ideas that will enable us to consider the ethics of international intervention in a systematic fashion, consistent with general precepts of human morality and politics, ones that actually underlie the consistent version of the system of politics of the United States of America. In short, should the United States become involved in the Balkan peace-keeping mission? What are the ethical and political guidelines that govern international military intervention? To address this question, which we must consider at a time when the United States of American seems to be getting involved in yet another foreign military conflict, we need to start the discussion with some remarks about how human beings ought to act toward one another. What basic principles should govern human relations? We begin the inquiry, that is, at the level of social ethics. The basic answer to our question is to be found in the theory of individual rights. When human beings who aren't intimates of one another interact, their central guiding principle depends on what kind of beings they are. Since human beings are moral agents, the first thing to consider about them is whether interacting with them intrudes upon them as choice making, moral agents. For morality requires, first and foremost, a sphere of personal jurisdiction. At this point someone might think we are far indeed from issues concerning international intervention, yet that would be a mistake. Indeed, the notion of (peaceful) national self-determination is entirely dependent on the fact that individual human beings are moral agents in need of a sphere of personal jurisdiction that makes their self-determination possible. Nations aren't moral agents. The call for (peaceful) national self-determination must, therefore, be understood as the call for the (peaceful) personal self-determination of members of a given community. From this it follows, almost directly, that if a nation is such that its self-determination is indeed that of the combined self-determinations of its citizenry, any intervention in its affairs would be no different from interfering with an individual who has embarked on self-determination without violating the personal spheres of others. Interaction with the people of such a nation may only be on peaceful terms, voluntarily agreed to by all parties. A fairly easy issue is when a nation abandons self-determination and embarks upon determining the affairs of others who have not given their consent to this policy. Thus when a nation attempts to aggress upon another, interaction with it should follow the ethics of self-defense. Whatever is needed to repel the aggressor is ethically permitted, indeed, often required. People have not only the right but the responsibility to defend themselves unless this would produce worse results for them than the aggression itself. The difficulty begins when the following sorts of situations obtain: (A) a nation aggresses upon another which is unable to defend itself and calls upon yet another nation to lend support to its defense. (B) A nation does not actually practice self-determination but exhibits some form of tyranny, whereby some members of the nation prevent others from engaging in self-determination. In (A), involving international aggression, it makes no difference whether the country is itself self-determined or a tyranny, for its aggression is unjustified in either case. Thus if a county of citizens with a given religious, ethnic or cultural tradition is completely united in its efforts to subdue another country, the culprit is simple to identify. Sometimes, however, a country may take military action against another when either (1) both internally violate the principle of self-determination (i.e., both are more or less severe tyrannies), or (2) one is a truly self-determined county but the target is not. In (1) there is no question that lending a hand to that country would be wrong, unless the disparity of tyrannies is very significant (i.e., when the lesser of the two evil countries is significantly better). In (2) the question centers on whether the tyranny is powerful enough to resist the justified intervention (e. g., in support of liberating the tyrannized among the citizenry) and whether the aid is promised in the first place (by some military agreement). In (B), involving intra-national oppression and injustice, we face the case we might examine at the micro level as follows: Suppose someone A, has legitimately contracted1 his or her security services to party P, and in the course of performing those services one notices that another party, C, is aggressing upon yet another party, D. Should A go to the aid of D? No, unless this does not interfere with the performance of the original contract between A and P and does not establish a precedent or a long term commitment that would distract from the original commitment. We have now come upon the situation often faced by the United States military. It is indeed frequently proposed that it ought to provide security services to parties who are in legitimate need of such services, i.e., in whose behalf offering such services would be ethically justified. But is it ethically required? Not unless the United States military can carry forth with its security services to those to whom it has the primary (contractual, constitutional) responsibility to do so. For practical purposes, as things stand in our world now, most altercations between and even within nations or countries are, in fact, muddied with histories of misconduct by the people involved on all sides. Even where this is not the case, the United States military has one, exclusive central purpose, namely, to stand ready to defend the citizens of the United States of America. Inasmuch as embarking on security missions elsewhere would distract from that commitment and/or involve it in commitments that would conflict with it, the United States military, assuming for this argument that it is a perfectly legitimate institution, ought not to embark upon interventions abroad. There is one point to be added to this very brief discussion: The United States of America forbids private citizens from embarking on military missions abroad. This could be justified only if such missions are directed against the United States of America itself, otherwise the policy is morally wrong and should be abandoned. Once that policy is abandoned, the task of going to the aid of foreign causes would not longer need to be laid at the feet of the United States military but could enlist the support of citizens who do not have prior military commitments and would not jeopardize these in the effort to lend a hand. ---------------------------------------------- Tibor R. Machan was Visiting Professor at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, in 1992-93. His most recent book is PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ILLUSIONS, published by the Independent Institute of Oakland, CA. ======================================================================== >Date: Mon, 6 Nov 1995 09:39:35 -0600 (CST) >From: Tibor R Machan There is one situation, pointed out by Nozick some years back (in one of his very few essays, a book review in REASON of JUST WAR by Michael Walzer, I believe), in which one may find oneself endorsing what seems like intervention. Suppose you are doing business with a vendor on Broadway and you body guard stands next to you as some hoods attack the vendor while quite obviously leaving you in peace. If I recall right, Nozick argued that your body guard, despite being in your hire alone, ought to intervene (if possible and prudent), since the hoods are not only violating the vendor's rights but yours, as well, namely, your right to free trade. (I think Nozick was trying to address some Middle-Eastern situation but I don't recall which.) What do you think? Would agreeing with this not suggest that if US citizens are trading with, say, Kuwaity firms when Iraq beings to attack Kuwait, the US military ought to respond and this would amount to the protection of the rights of American citizens? Or do American citizens no longer gain protection of their rights from the US when they leave the country? Or is that a matter of special agreement? Tibor Machan